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Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive overview of a critical infra-
structure system, of failures and impacts that occur within it and of the resilience, which 
effectively reduces the risk of these impacts spreading on to dependent subsystems. The 
chapter presents a basic description of a critical infrastructure system and of the hierar-
chic arrangement of its subsystems and linkages between them. Critical infrastructure 
system failures, including their causes and impacts on dependent subsystems and on 
society as a whole, are presented in the following section. Particular focus is given to the 
propagation of impacts in a critical infrastructure system and the current approaches to 
their modeling. The chapter concludes by expounding on the resilience of critical infra-
structure subsystems and its impact on the minimization of failures in critical infrastruc-
ture subsystems in circumstances involving emergencies.
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1. Introduction
Society has traditionally depended on a broad variety of services as much as on the infra-
structures providing them. Over time, some of these infrastructures, or rather their elements 
considered to be of vital importance to society, began to be regarded as critical. At present, 
these infrastructures constitute the critical infrastructure system [1], which consists of indi-
vidual subsystems, i.e., sectors, subsectors, and elements. There are dependencies between 
critical infrastructure subsystems which can, due to a disruption in the functionality of one 
subsystem, spread to dependent subsystems, and thereby escalate the impacts from emergen-
cies on society.
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the t rms of the Crea ive
Comm ns Attribution Lic nse (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
2. Critical infrastructure system description
The issue of critical infrastructure protection began to be addressed in the United States in 
response to a terrorist bombing on a federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 [2]. Over the 
following years, other countries also started tackling these problems, e.g., from 1998 in Canada 
and from 1999 in the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland. Following the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, the majority of European countries proceeded to define “Critical 
Infrastructure” and began to take actions aimed at its protection [3].
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) currently defines a critical infrastructure 
as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity 
or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national eco-
nomic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters” [4]. A critical 
infrastructure at the European Union level is specified in a Council Directive [1], defining a 
critical infrastructure as “an asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential 
for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of 
people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State 
as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.”
The hierarchic arrangement of a critical infrastructure system has three levels that constitute 
a vertical classification [3]: system level, sector level, and element level (see Figure 1). The 
system level is the basic classification of a critical infrastructure according to its functions. 
This level comprises two areas, namely the technical infrastructure and the socioeconomic 
infrastructure. The technical infrastructure includes sectors producing and providing  specific 
Figure 1. Hierarchic arrangement in a critical infrastructure system.
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commodities (e.g., energy and water supply) or sectors providing technical services (e.g., 
transport or ICT systems). The socioeconomic infrastructure is composed of sectors that pro-
vide social or economic services (e.g., health care, financial and currency markets, emergency 
services, and public administration). There are significant dependencies between two types 
of critical infrastructure [5]. For instance, all of the socioeconomic sectors require the unre-
stricted availability of commodities produced by the technical infrastructure sectors, whereas 
the technical infrastructure, by contrast, fully depends on the socioeconomic sectors, espe-
cially in crisis situations.
The sector level is composed of the individual sectors and subsectors of a critical infrastruc-
ture. This level represents the classification of specific sectors and their mutual linkages. The 
transportation sector, for example, is made up of five subsectors, namely road transport, rail 
transport, air transport, inland waterways transport, and ocean and short-sea shipping and 
ports [1]. The individual elements that form the element level are the basic building blocks of 
the critical infrastructure system. These elements reach different degrees of relevance within 
the system, depending on the extent of the impact that their disruption or failure can poten-
tially produce.
It is imperative that a critical infrastructure system be viewed in a comprehensive manner, 
taking into account its networked arrangement where individual subsystems are interlinked 
via various types of linkages. The basic structure of these linkages arises from their character 
and includes one-way linkages, which represent an influence or dependency, and two-way 
linkages involving interdependency. Rinaldi et al. [6] have classified interdependencies in 
more detail as physical, cybernetic, geographic, and logical in nature and noted that interde-
pendencies increase the risk of failures or disruptions in multiple infrastructures. Pederson 
et al. [5] have subsequently further classified these linkages for lower levels of detail.
3. Impacts of critical infrastructure system failures on dependent 
subsystems and society
Like any other complex system, a critical infrastructure system includes a multitude of ele-
ments with different levels of importance, categorized into several levels and interconnected 
by linkages of various types and intensity. Such a structural arrangement leads to a broad 
correlation between individual subsystems, which determines the manner and intensity of 
propagation of impacts from critical infrastructure system failures on dependent subsystems 
and society.
3.1. Critical infrastructure system failures
The functioning of a critical infrastructure system is constantly being threatened by a wide 
range of security threats. These threats can be generally categorized into five basic groups [7]:
• climatological threats (including natural disasters such as floods, tornadoes, heavy snow-
fall, or extensive fires);
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• geological threats (e.g., earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides);
• biological threats (e.g., pandemics);
• technological threats (including technological emergencies such as radiation emergencies, 
hazardous chemical spills, flooding caused by damage to hydraulic structures, widespread 
disruptions to engineering networks, public water supply emergencies or major road, rail, 
or air traffic accidents); and
• criminal threats (e.g., terrorism, criminal activity, armed conflicts).
The effects produced by these threats on a critical infrastructure system or its subsystems can 
cause adverse events, which can in turn lead to disruptions or in extreme cases, failures of dif-
ferent subsystems. This involves, in particular, disruptions to functional parameters causing 
a decline in the performance of specific elements (see Figure 2) where the decline is directly 
proportional to the intensity of the emergency and the degree of resilience of the respective 
critical infrastructure element.
Depending on the category of threats, three types of emergencies, that subsequently gener-
ate individual failures, can occur in a critical infrastructure system. These include intentional 
anthropogenic events (i.e., terrorism and criminal activity), unintentional anthropogenic 
events (i.e., technological emergencies), and natural events (i.e., climatological, geological, 
and biological threats). Once generated, the failures can propagate further within a critical 
infrastructure system and produce negative impacts of different character, intensity, and 
effect. Rinaldi et al. [6] were the first to define the basic types of failure propagation in a criti-
cal infrastructure system:
• A cascading failure occurs when a disruption in one infrastructure causes the failure of 
element in a second infrastructure, which subsequently causes a disruption in the second 
infrastructure (e.g., electric power failure could create disruption in other infrastructures).
• An escalating failure occurs when an existing disruption in one infrastructure exacerbates 
an independent disruption of a second infrastructure, generally in the form of increasing 
the severity or the time for recovery of the second failure (e.g., disruption in ICT network 
may escalate to disruption in a road transport network).
• A common cause occurs when two or more infrastructure networks are disrupted at the 
same time: elements within each network fail because of some common cause (e.g., action 
of natural disaster to all local infrastructures).
Over the following years, numerous scholarly papers and studies attempting to elaborate on 
and tackle the issue of failure propagation within a critical infrastructure system from different 
viewpoints were published based on the work of Rinaldi et al. [6]. These include Visualization 
of Critical Infrastructure Failure [8], Cascading Effects of Common-Cause Failures in Critical 
Infrastructures [9], Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Failure with a Resilience Inoperability 
Input–Output Model [10], or Time-based critical infrastructure dependency analysis for 
large-scale and cross-sectoral failures [11] to name a few.
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3.2. Impacts of critical infrastructure system failures
Critical infrastructure system failures subsequently produce negative impacts. These impacts 
can propagate further not only within the critical infrastructure system (between dependent 
subsystems), but also outside the system where they can specifically affect society, including 
national interests such as state security, the economy, and basic human needs [1].
The intensity and propagation of the impacts from critical infrastructure system failures is 
affected by several external and internal factors of the system concerned. While the external fac-
tors include, in particular, resilience of society and the character, and the scope and duration of 
an emergency; the principal internal factors include the type and scope of the failure inside the 
system [6], subsystem linkages, and subsystem resilience. The nature of the impacts is charac-
terized by the scope, structure, intensity, duration, and effect of the emergency (see Figure 3) [3].
In the event of a disruption to a critical infrastructure system, the impacts spread into two 
basic areas. The first instance involves impacts within the system where the failure of one 
critical infrastructure subsystem causes a failure of another subsystem in what is known as 
a cascading effect [6]. In the second instance, the impacts exert influence outside the system, 
specifically, on society, producing negative effects on national interests such as security, the 
economy, and basic human needs [3].
In both of the above-mentioned cases, the impacts may be classified as direct or indirect from 
a structural point of view. The immediate effect of a disrupted subsystem on another subsys-
tem or directly on society is considered to be a direct or primary action. In contrast, indirect 
effects of impacts occur vicariously through any critical infrastructure subsystem, regard-
less of whether or not they affect another subsystem or society as a result. Indirect effects 
of impacts may be secondary (through one subsystem) or multi-structural (through several 
subsystems) in character [3].
Figure 2. Disruption to an element in a critical infrastructure system.
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Other important factors determining the character of impacts are their intensity and duration. 
The impact intensity depends on the extent of a failure in a subsystem, that in turn affects 
another critical infrastructure subsystem, as well as on the level of their linkage. If the link-
age is weak, the impact intensity is low and the subsequent impact on the affected subsystem 
is limited. However, if this linkage is strong, the impact intensity is high and the impact on 
the affected subsystem can be devastating or absolute. The impact duration, which may be 
short-term, medium-term, or long-term, represents an important variable with respect to the 
impact intensity. Ouyang et al. [12] present the typical time progression of a critical infrastruc-
ture disruption, dividing it into prevention, propagation, damage, assessment, and recovery 
periods [3].
Another key factor determining the character of impacts is the effect of their action. If the 
impacts of a disrupted subsystems act on another subsystem or society in one way only, the 
impact effect can be regarded as a single impact. However, if the impact effects are multi-way 
(e.g., through the combination of direct and indirect impacts) and occur concurrently in real-
time, then the effects are considered to be synergistic [3].
Figure 3. Aspects that create the character of impacts in a critical infrastructure system [3].
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3.3. Propagation of impacts in a critical infrastructure system
The above-mentioned aspects, shaping the character of impacts, also significantly contribute 
to the propagation of these impacts in a critical infrastructure system. At the core of their prop-
agation lie critical infrastructure system failures caused by the negative effects of security risks 
(i.e., causes of disruptions or failures of a critical infrastructure), which can be either external 
or internal in nature. Such impacts can then exert a direct influence on society (i.e., direct 
impacts), spread further across the critical infrastructure, and cause other failures, which lead 
to additional impacts (i.e., cascading impacts) or they can, due to a cascading effect, act jointly 
on a single target (i.e., synergistic impacts). See Figure 4 for a graphical representation of all 
the potential ways in which impacts can propagate within a critical infrastructure system.
Direct impacts are impacts caused by the disruption or failure of a critical infrastructure sub-
system, which act directly on society. The effects of a security threat (e.g., a terror attack) to a 
component of a critical road infrastructure of international importance (e.g., a major freeway 
bridge) can be used as an example. These negative effects result in the disruption to the func-
tional parameters of the freeway, which has a direct impact on society (in this instance on 
passengers and freeway network operators).
Cascading impacts are impacts caused by the disruption or failure of a critical infrastructure 
subsystem, which spread further across the critical infrastructure, resulting in failures in 
dependent subsystems that in turn lead to an escalation in other impacts. The effects of a secu-
rity threat (e.g., a gale) to a component of a critical electric energy infrastructure of national 
importance (e.g., 110 kV distribution system) can be used as an example. These negative effects 
result in the disruption to functional parameters of the distribution system, which cascades 
into dependent subsystems (e.g., a railroad signaling system). The disruption to a distribution 
system then results in a cascading impact on society due to nonfunctioning railroad transport.
Figure 4. Ways of impact propagation in a critical infrastructure system.
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Synergistic impacts are impacts caused by the disruption or failure of two or more critical 
infrastructure subsystems which occur concurrently, thereby exacerbating their impacts on 
society [3, 9]. The effects of a security threat (e.g., a technological accident) to element of a 
critical electric energy infrastructure of international importance (e.g., a nuclear power plant) 
can be used as an example. These negative effects result not only in direct impacts on society 
(i.e., large-scale power outages), but also in the impacts cascading to dependent subsystems 
(e.g., heat production and distribution), the disruption of which produces additional impacts 
on society. This situation brings about a synergistic effect, consisting of the added effect of 
joint impacts on society, and increasing their mere sum [3].
3.4. Modeling of impacts of critical infrastructure system failures
Modeling the anticipated propagation of impacts constitutes an important approach contrib-
uting to their minimization in a critical infrastructure system. However, it involves a complex 
process which should be based on mathematical modeling as well as on the integration of 
innovative approaches to analyze the critical infrastructure system. The basis for this process 
should include, in particular [13]:
• early indication of impacts using a bottom-up approach;
• harmonization and transformation of cross-cutting criteria at the regional level;
• European critical infrastructure risk and safety/security management; and
• implementation of a preferential critical infrastructure risk assessment.
An early indication of impacts through the application of a bottom-up approach should 
be based on the determination of resilience disruption indicators in interconnected criti-
cal infrastructure subsystems. It is a holistic approach to assess the resilience of a critical 
infrastructure based on a comprehensive perception of specific political, economic, social, 
technological, legislative, and ecological environments. The essence of this approach is a sys-
tematic approach consisting of a cross-sectoral evaluation based on a research into the mutual 
linkages between individual critical infrastructure subsystems. It factors in the propagation 
of cascading impacts and synergistic effects in a critical infrastructure system. The refer-
enced system solution should be applied using a progressive bottom-up approach, which is 
based on a critical infrastructure evaluation from the lowest level (city, region) upwards and 
has already been implemented in a number of developed countries (e.g., Switzerland and 
the Netherlands). This approach can be viewed as the logical continuation of the ongoing 
research into critical infrastructure security in terms of integrating the research results, via 
identifiers describing the critical infrastructure status, into a composite resilience indicator 
(see Figure 5) [13].
The application of the bottom-up approach is closely related to the need to harmonize 
and transform cross-cutting criteria at the regional level. Individual Member States of the 
European Union have already set the cross-cutting criteria values for national critical infra-
structure elements. However, the vast majority of states have failed to disclose these val-
ues, making the follow-up research into the modeling of the impacts on society particularly 
System of System Failures82
 challenging. For this purpose, it is possible to use the results of the international RAIN project 
[15] undertaken as part of the EU's 7th Framework Programme. Based on recommendations 
arising from a European Union directive [1] and a regulation on the criteria for determining 
critical infrastructure elements adopted by the government of the Czech Republic [16], the 
following cross-cutting criteria were defined for a wider international debate within the RAIN 
project [15]:
• health impacts—the number of victims with a threshold value of more than 25 fatalities 
or more than 250 individuals hospitalized for a period exceeding 24 hours per 1 million 
inhabitants within the region under review;
• economic impacts with an economic loss threshold value of over 0.5% of gross domestic 
product; and
• impacts on the public with a threshold value of more than 12,500 individuals per 1 million 
inhabitants within the region under review affected by extensive restrictions in the provi-
sion of essential services or by other major disruptions to everyday life.
A provisional transformation of national criteria could form the basis for the setting of cross-
cutting criteria values at the regional level (note: however, this method of setting regional 
values is not ideal in terms of applying the bottom-up approach as it is more akin to the top-
down approach due to the transformation of national criteria). The transformation involves 
the dynamic conversion of threshold values for national cross-cutting criteria to regional crite-
ria. This ratio is mainly applied as a proportion of the population of a given state to the popu-
lation of the region concerned, and of the threshold values of national cross-cutting criteria to 
those of regional cross-cutting criteria. In principal, static threshold values are converted to 
dynamic values not only due to the varying population sizes in different regions, but also due 
to the different levels of gross domestic product generated in these regions [17].
Figure 5. Development of the approach to a critical infrastructure research [14].
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European critical infrastructure risk and safety/security management comprises an important 
aspect of modeling the impacts of critical infrastructure failures. In adopting this approach, 
risks are recognized at an early stage, allowing for a timely indication of impacts on indepen-
dent critical infrastructure subsystems. The following methodologies should be employed 
with a view to optimize the risk and safety/security management system and comply with the 
requirements for crisis preparedness plans applicable to critical infrastructures entities, as an 
equivalent to the Operator Security Plan:
• Methodology for selected CIs system resilience element evaluation [18]; and
• Methodology for ensuring the protection of CIs in the production, transmission, and dis-
tribution of electricity [19].
Implementation of a preferential critical infrastructure risk assessment provides another 
important basis for the modeling of impacts produced by critical infrastructure failures [20]. 
This allows the assessor to introduce subjective conditions into an otherwise objective process 
of risk assessment, providing the assessor with an option to partially influence the assessment 
process by preferring certain factors over others. The significance of this phase of the assess-
ment process lies in the fact that different entities perceive certain risks from different points 
of view, which creates a conducive environment for discussion of all stakeholders, ensuring 
the most appropriate safety/security actions are taken. Moreover, a preferential critical infra-
structure risk assessment also provides an important basis for the modeling of impacts of 
critical infrastructure failures as its results determine vulnerabilities enabling the propagation 
of impacts throughout the critical infrastructure system [13].
4. Resilience of critical infrastructure subsystems
The purpose of each critical infrastructure subsystem is to deliver services to recipients. It 
is therefore essential to ensure that each subsystem is fully functional and that appropriate 
steps are taken to minimize its failures and curtail the propagation of any potential impacts 
on society or any other dependent critical infrastructure subsystems. According to existing 
scientific knowledge, the best and most effective way of minimizing the impacts of critical 
infrastructure system failures is to reach the highest possible level of resilience with respect 
to all of its subsystems.
4.1. Definition of resilience
The term resilience was first defined in connection with the resistance and stability of ecologi-
cal systems where two types of system behavior were identified [21]. The first type, stability, 
is the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a temporary disturbance and 
the more rapidly it returns, the more stable it is. The second type of system behavior, known 
as resilience, is a measure of the ability of a system to absorb impacts without significant 
changes to the system status. Over time, this perspective was expanded to include the sphere 
of sociology, which then led to resilience being explored in socio-ecological systems. Based on 
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the achieved results, the research into resilience gradually spread to other disciplines such as 
psychology, economy, and engineering.
In 2001, Holling shed light on understanding the complexity of economic, ecological, and 
social systems with the publication of a definition based on two fundamental components of 
each system, namely hierarchy and adaptive cycles [22]. Together they form panarchy accord-
ing to Holling. Panarchy can be defined as a structure in which systems of nature and humans 
are interlinked in never-ending adaptive cycles of growth, accumulation, restructuring, and 
renewal.
The research into the resilience of socio-ecological systems also sparked an interest in research 
focused on resilience in society. The resilience of a society is dependent on its ability to respond 
to a stress factor and can be defined as “The ability of a system, community or society exposed to 
hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in 
a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic 
structures and functions through risk management” [23].
Resilience gradually began to be defined in general terms for any system, including engineer-
ing. Resilience was first described in connection with a critical infrastructure in a document 
entitled Critical Infrastructure Resilience Final Report and Recommendations [24], where it 
is defined as the ability to absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially dis-
ruptive event. By contrast, the critical infrastructure resilience strategy [25] defines critical 
infrastructure resilience as the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of a disruptive 
event. These definitions clearly show what constitutes resilience, or rather what character-
istics enhance the resilience of a system. For example, Chandra [26], based on his study of 
socio-ecological systems, includes the following attributes in engineering systems resilience: 
redundancy, adaptability, flexibility, interoperability, and diversity.
As research into the resilience of critical infrastructures has since been pursued by numerous 
leading research workers and institutions, the definition of resilience has been repeated over 
and over again without any added value. However, the different approaches to determin-
ing their attributes/aspects/components/properties/characteristics/capacities/abilities/assets/
parameters may be worth mentioning. Below are some examples of the different approaches:
• Ehlen et al. [27]—absorption, adaptation, and recovery.
• Keeping the country running [28]—the ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt, and/or rapidly 
recover. For the system to function as a whole, it must incorporate four assets or elements: 
resistance, reliability, redundancy, response, and recovery.
• Carlson et al. [29]—the form of linkages between six aspects (anticipation, resistance, ab-
sorption, ability to respond, adaptability, and recovery), which according to the author 
define resilience, and four parameters (preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery), 
which characterize the process of enhancing the resilience capacity of a system.
• Béné et al. [30]—three basic aspects: absorptive capacity (the ability to cope with the im-
pacts of adverse changes and shocks), adaptive capacity (the ability of a system to adapt to 
changes), and transformative capacity (the ability to create a fundamentally new system).
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• Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience [31]—the abil-
ity to prepare, resist, and rapidly recover.
• Hromada et al. [32]—preparedness and adaptability as the basis for the fulfillment of 
the resilience function. Key indicators: robustness, preparedness, ability to respond, 
recoverability.
• Eid et al. [33]—the ability to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond, adapt, and rapidly recover 
from a disruption.
• Ortiz De La Torre et al. [34]—prepare, prevent, and protect (before the disruption), miti-
gate, absorb and adapt (during the disruption), and respond, recover and learn (after the 
disruption).
• Bologna et al. [35]—the overall activities of modeling, and analysis of critical infrastructure 
system aimed to evaluate the ability to prevent, absorb, adapt, and recover from a disrup-
tive event, either natural or man-made.
• Nan and Sansavini [36]—ability of the system to withstand a change or a disruptive event 
by reducing the initial negative impacts (absorptive capability), by adapting itself to them 
(adaptive capability), and by recovering from them (restorative capability).
Some experts consider critical infrastructure resilience to be the primary national policy 
framework and a vital criterion for the future sustainability of cities or infrastructures as such, 
and argue that, from a broader perspective, resilience is indispensable in terms of population 
protection and crisis management [33, 37].
4.2. Concept of critical infrastructure resilience
Based on the accepted definitions, resilience can be said to represent the level of internal 
preparedness of critical infrastructure subsystems for emergencies or the ability of these sub-
systems to perform and maintain their functions when negatively affected by internal and/
or external factors. Strengthening resilience (e.g., Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure [38] 
or Labaka et al. [39]) minimizes the vulnerability of subsystems, which in turn curtails the 
occurrence, intensity, and propagation of failures and their impacts in a critical infrastructure 
system and society.
Understanding and clear definition of resilience represent the cornerstone of resilience 
assessment and strengthen with respect to critical infrastructure subsystems. In fact, critical 
infrastructure system resilience must be understood as a cyclic process based on continual 
strengthening of resilience of individual subsystems (see Figure 6). The crucial phases of this 
process are prevention, absorption, recovery, and adaptation.
The first phase of the critical infrastructure resilience cycle is prevention. In individual critical 
infrastructure subsystems, this is determined by permanent preparedness and protection of 
each subsystem. Prevention is provided on a continuous basis until a subsystem disruption 
occurs, at which time it is suspended, and for the duration of the emergency, replaced by 
absorption.
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Absorption, the second phase of the resilience cycle, is initiated if a subsystem is disrupted 
due to an emergency and is determined by the critical infrastructure subsystem robustness. 
Accordingly, robustness is determined by the ability of a critical infrastructure element to 
absorb the effects of an emergency. In a critical infrastructure system, two types of robust-
ness are recognized, namely structural and security robustness. Structural robustness is deter-
mined by the progress in the decline of a function and the level of redundancy, while security 
robustness is based on the level of protective measures, detection, and ability to respond.
The recovery phase starts after the effects of an emergency have worn off. This phase is char-
acterized by recoverability, which is the capacity of a subsystem to recover its function to the 
required level of performance after the effects of an emergency no longer exist. The success 
of recovery is determined by the available resources and the time required to complete the 
recovery process.
The final phase of the critical infrastructure resilience cycle is adaptation, which is essentially 
the ability of an organization to adapt a subsystem to subsequent effects of an emergency. It 
represents the dynamic long-acting ability of an organization to adapt to changes in circum-
stances. Adaptation is determined by the internal processes of an organization focused on 
the strengthening of resilience, i.e., risk management and innovation/education processes. 
However, strengthening of the resilience of a subsystem already occurs during the recovery 
phase of its performance.
4.3. Resilience assessment in a critical infrastructure system
The Resilience Assessment and Evaluation of Computing Systems compilation monograph 
[40] was the first comprehensive overview study exploring critical infrastructure resilience 
assessment in the field of information and communication technology. Another impor-
tant monograph, Critical Infrastructure System Security and Resiliency [41], introducing a 
practical methodology for the development of an efficient system of critical infrastructure 
Figure 6. Cycle of critical infrastructure resilience.
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protection, was published a year later. This methodology focuses both on the prevention of 
emergencies and the mitigation of its consequences. The same year saw the publication of the 
Resilience Measurement Index: An Indicator of Critical Infrastructure Resilience study [42], 
whose main objective is to measure the ability of a critical infrastructure to reduce the magni-
tude and/or duration of impacts from disruptive events.
In 2013, the European Commission published a working document on a new approach to 
the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection: Making European Critical 
Infrastructures more secure [43]. This document clearly emphasized the importance of resil-
ience and interdependencies in a critical infrastructure as well as the need to develop tools 
and methods for their assessment.
In addition, the issue of measuring critical infrastructure resilience has long been explored by 
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule 
Zürich). The institute presents the results of its risk and resilience research in the form of 
scientific reports, with the issue of resilience measurement addressed in detail in the SKI 
Focus Report 8: Measuring Resilience [44] and the SKI Focus Report 9: Measuring Critical 
Infrastructure Resilience [45].
There are also several major international projects dealing with critical infrastructure resil-
ience assessment at present, including SMART RESILIENCE: Smart Resilience Indicators for 
Smart Critical Infrastructures, IMPROVER: Improved Risk Evaluation and Implementation of 
Resilience Concepts to Critical Infrastructure, RESILIENS: Realizing European Resilience for 
Critical Infrastructure, or RESILIENCE 2015: Dynamic Resilience Evaluation of Interrelated 
Critical Infrastructure Subsystems.
In 2016, a comprehensive approach based on the results of leading research projects was 
published in the Guidelines for Critical Infrastructures Resilience Evaluation document [35]. 
This approach has its basis in the evaluation of individual indicators constituting resilience, 
the resulting composite indicator being a function of indicators in technical (i.e., prevention, 
absorption, adaptation, and recovery), personal, organizational, and cooperative dimensions.
Additional significant approaches to evaluate resilience have been presented, for example, 
in an interim report of the project RESILIENS D2.2: Qualitative, Semi-Quantitative and 
Quantitative Methods and Measures for Resilience Assessment and Enhancement [34]. The 
second part of the document presents a critical infrastructure resilience assessment tool 
(CI-RAT), which has been developed as part of this project and is based on a semi-quantitative 
methodology for CI resilience assessment, and on a CI resilience management concept.
5. Conclusion
The chapter entitled “Failures in a Critical Infrastructure System” presents a comprehensive 
overview of a critical infrastructure system, which may be regarded as the basis for ensuring 
the functional continuity of society from both the economic and social perspectives. The intro-
ductory part of the chapter is designed as a historical framework, defining critical infrastruc-
tures in relation to legislative, normative, and institutional processes involved in addressing 
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the issues concerned. The described framework formulates the basis, approaches, and logic of 
a hierarchical system arrangement in connection to interdependencies and linkages between 
elementary elements. Infrastructure failures have been classified in terms of their sources and 
causes because the potential impacts of failures in selected dependent systems can have pro-
found effects on the functioning of society as a whole. It was argued that the impacts of fail-
ures in dependent systems increase the occurrence of cascading and synergistic effects, which 
fundamentally affect the resilience of individual elements and the general function of the 
system. This led to establishing the relationship between system resilience and failures with 
respect to critical infrastructure network elements.
Based on these facts, the impacts of failures and their propagation were described in the 
context of the necessity to model such impacts. In this regard, the significance and appli-
cability of top-down and bottom-up approaches in relation to the exploration of mutual 
linkages was further compared as one of the identifiers describing the critical infrastruc-
ture status. The significance of identifying and labeling critical infrastructure elements 
is, therefore, also viewed from the perspective of the need for a more objective setting 
of cross-cutting criteria values, equally applicable at the regional level. As already men-
tioned, element resilience exerts a substantial effect on the overall impacts of potential 
failures. That is why a resilience framework for critical infrastructure subsystems was 
established with a view to defining resilience, formulating a resilience concept, and set-
ting up a resilience evaluation process in a critical infrastructure system. The presented 
facts are based on the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic Security Research 
project—RESILIENCE 2015: Dynamic Resilience Evaluation of Interrelated Critical 
Infrastructure Subsystems and form a resilience knowledge base as the ability of a system, 
community, or society exposed to adverse events to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt 
to, transform, and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, 
including through the preservation and recovery of its essential basic structures and func-
tions through risk management.
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